Swedish Center For Studies And Research
Saudi Arabia is no longer measured solely by its ability to launch mega-projects or reshape its economy through Vision 2030. After years of rapid economic and social transformation, new questions are increasingly confronting policymakers and observers alike: Does economic development remain the state’s foremost priority, or have concerns over security and internal stability once again moved higher up the national agenda?
This debate emerges at a complex regional moment in which security tensions intersect with economic challenges. From the ongoing war in Yemen and regional competition with Iran to the financial pressures associated with funding large-scale development projects, the Kingdom faces a far more complicated landscape than the one that existed when Vision 2030 was launched in 2016.
In recent months, discussions about the nature of Saudi Arabia’s security model have returned to the forefront, amid growing attention to military cooperation with external partners and renewed assessments of the role played by military and security institutions in safeguarding domestic stability and protecting the Kingdom’s strategic interests.
The significance of this debate does not lie in the scale of foreign military cooperation itself, but rather in the broader questions it raises about the relationship between security and development, and about the state’s ability to achieve its economic ambitions in a regional environment that is becoming increasingly volatile year after year.
The Architecture of Power in the Kingdom
To understand the ongoing debate surrounding security and the military’s role in Saudi Arabia, it is necessary to examine how the Kingdom’s institutions of power have been structured over the decades.
Unlike many regional states that relied on strong, centralized armies, Saudi Arabia developed a different model based on distributing coercive power among multiple military and security institutions, including the armed forces, the Ministry of Interior, the National Guard, and various security agencies. This structure was designed to ensure that no single institution could monopolize the instruments of armed power.
According to Gulf and regional security specialist Andreas Krieg, this model was not solely about military effectiveness. Rather, it formed part of a broader mechanism for managing political stability within the Kingdom, whereby military and security influence was distributed across multiple centers of authority to prevent the emergence of an independent power bloc capable of reshaping the balance of governance.
Historically, the Saudi National Guard played a pivotal role in this arrangement. While the armed forces were primarily responsible for external defense, the National Guard evolved as a parallel force with its own institutional structure and distinct chain of command, reinforcing the principle of balance among the Kingdom’s security and military institutions.
However, this equation has undergone significant transformation in recent years with the rise of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and the launch of a far-reaching process of restructuring state institutions and redefining traditional centers of influence within the ruling family and the security apparatus.
From the removal of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Nayef in 2017, to the high-profile detentions at the Ritz-Carlton hotel, and the restructuring of several key sovereign institutions, Saudi Arabia entered an unprecedented phase of concentrating executive and political authority in the hands of the Crown Prince.
For many analysts, these developments represented more than a series of administrative reforms. Rather, they formed part of a broader effort to re-engineer the balance of power within the Saudi state and redefine the relationship between traditional institutions and a newly centralized center of decision-making.
Yemen: Saudi Arabia’s Test of Power
If the architecture of power within the Kingdom was historically designed to ensure internal balance and political stability, the war in Yemen represented the first major test of this model’s ability to manage a prolonged and open-ended conflict.
When Saudi Arabia launched Operation Decisive Storm in 2015, its stated objective was to restore Yemen’s internationally recognized government and prevent the expansion of Iranian-backed Houthi influence. Yet after years of military operations and massive expenditures, Riyadh was unable to achieve a decisive military outcome commensurate with the scale of resources committed to the war.
Throughout the conflict, Saudi oil facilities, airports, and military bases came under repeated missile and drone attacks, while the Kingdom’s southern border evolved into a persistent arena of military and security attrition.
At the same time, Saudi Arabia increasingly relied on local Yemeni formations and allied forces to manage large portions of ground operations, while its most visible role remained centered on air power, air defense systems, logistics, and advanced military technology.
This does not necessarily indicate a lack of military capability. Rather, it highlights the nature of the military model that evolved within the Kingdom over the past decades one that places greater emphasis on technological superiority and air power than on maintaining a large, independent ground force with extensive combat experience.
Several Gulf security analysts argue that the war exposed a gap between the scale of Saudi military spending and the ability to translate that expenditure into decisive battlefield outcomes, particularly in unconventional conflicts characterized by prolonged attrition and complex local networks.
For policymakers in Riyadh, the Yemen war was not merely a confrontation with the Houthis. It became a broader test that raised fundamental questions about the structure of the military institution itself, the relationship between internal security and political stability, and the requirements for building an armed force capable of responding to increasingly complex regional threats.
The experience also prompted researchers and defense analysts to reassess the relationship between defense spending and military effectiveness questions that would resurface in later years as Saudi Arabia confronted growing security and economic challenges in the era beyond Vision 2030.
Mohammed bin Salman and the Reshaping of Power
The consequences of the Yemen war coincided with unprecedented transformations within Saudi Arabia’s governing structure. Since 2017, the Kingdom has undergone a sweeping redistribution of power centers across the state, alongside the rise of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman as the most influential figure in the Saudi political system.
These changes began with the removal of then-Crown Prince Mohammed bin Nayef, widely regarded as one of the principal architects of Saudi Arabia’s modern security apparatus. This was followed by a series of measures that included the restructuring of key sovereign institutions and the high-profile anti-corruption campaign centered on the Ritz-Carlton detentions, which targeted princes, business elites, and former senior officials.
For the Saudi leadership, these steps were presented as part of a reform agenda aimed at combating corruption and accelerating the modernization of the state. For many researchers and observers, however, they also represented a comprehensive reconfiguration of traditional power balances within the ruling family and state institutions.
According to Middle East political economy scholar Steffen Hertog, the transformations witnessed in Saudi Arabia over the past decade extended far beyond economic and social reforms. They also involved a fundamental restructuring of the relationship between state institutions and the political center of decision-making, resulting in an unprecedented concentration of executive authority in modern Saudi history.
At the same time, Mohammed bin Salman launched Vision 2030 as the framework guiding the Kingdom’s economic and social transformation. The initiative was presented as a roadmap for rebuilding the Saudi economy, reducing dependence on oil revenues, creating opportunities for a growing young population, and attracting global investment.
Yet this ambitious project also placed the Saudi leadership before a complex equation: the more centralized political decision-making became, the greater the direct responsibility of the leadership for the success or failure of the major projects associated with the Vision.
Over time, projects such as NEOM, The Line, and Trojena ceased to be merely development initiatives. Instead, they became closely tied to the political and personal stake that the Crown Prince placed on the Kingdom’s future trajectory and long-term economic transformation.
As a result, the restructuring of power and the drive for economic transformation became two sides of the same process. The success of Vision 2030 would no longer be measured solely by the scale of the projects launched, but also by the political system’s ability to manage the economic, institutional, and security challenges accompanying this unprecedented transformation.
From NEOM to Trojena: When Ambition Collides with Reality
Since its launch in 2016, Vision 2030 has represented the most ambitious economic and social transformation project in the history of modern Saudi Arabia. NEOM was never intended to be merely a new city; it became the flagship symbol of the Vision itself and the clearest expression of Saudi Arabia’s ambition to redefine development, urban planning, and economic growth in the region.
Over time, however, growing signs began to emerge of a widening gap between the scale of the ambition and the practical challenges of implementation.
The most prominent example is The Line. According to a report by the Financial Times, the project initially began as a relatively conventional modern city before evolving into a far more ambitious concept: a 170-kilometer linear city consisting of two parallel mirrored structures rising approximately 500 meters into the air.
The newspaper cited individuals involved in the planning process who stated that many of the project’s defining characteristics—including its final design and engineering dimensions—were shaped through direct guidance from Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.
Yet the challenge was not merely architectural; it was also financial.
According to the same report, internal studies estimated the cost of The Line at approximately $1.6 trillion by the end of 2021. Subsequent estimates reportedly rose to nearly $4.5 trillion, a figure approaching the annual gross domestic product of Germany.
The report further noted that some major decisions related to the project were made on the basis of conceptual designs and digital renderings before the completion of the detailed engineering and feasibility studies necessary to assess its practical viability.
Nor were these challenges limited to The Line alone.
In 2024, Bloomberg reported that Saudi Arabia had significantly scaled back some of the project’s near-term expectations. The projected population target for 2030 was reportedly reduced from approximately 1.5 million residents to fewer than 300,000, while estimates suggested that only a small portion of the planned 170-kilometer development might be completed by that date.
Meanwhile, Trojena, the mountain tourism and winter sports destination planned within NEOM and promoted as a symbol of the Kingdom’s ability to deliver unprecedented megaprojects, has also faced challenges related to cost, timelines, and the complexities of construction in a demanding geographical and climatic environment.
For many analysts, the significance of these developments lies not in the difficulties faced by any single project, but in what they reveal about the limits of a development model built around launching multiple megaprojects at a pace that may exceed the capacity of institutions, labor markets, and administrative systems to absorb and execute them effectively.
As Middle East political economy scholar Steffen Hertog argues, the greatest challenge facing large-scale transformation projects in rentier states is not simply access to funding. Rather, it is the ability of institutions to manage highly complex, long-term projects requiring specialized expertise, markets capable of absorbing rapid structural change, and a stable economic environment that can sustain expected returns over time.
The Economy Under Pressure
The challenges facing Saudi Arabia’s megaprojects are no longer purely engineering or administrative in nature. Increasingly, they are shaped by the broader economic and regional environment in which the Kingdom operates.
Over the past decade, Vision 2030 has been built on a central assumption: that oil revenues and fiscal surpluses would provide the financial foundation necessary to fund large-scale transformation projects, while foreign investment and economic diversification would gradually reduce dependence on hydrocarbons.
Yet rising regional tensions have introduced a new variable into the equation: security.
As regional competition intensifies, military expenditures remain high, and concerns over the security of energy infrastructure and maritime trade routes return to the forefront, the Saudi state finds itself allocating increasing resources to protect its strategic interests. At the same time, it must continue financing some of the most ambitious economic transformation projects ever undertaken in the region.
According to official data and international economic assessments, Saudi Arabia has recorded recurring fiscal deficits in recent years due to fluctuations in oil prices and rising government expenditures, while infrastructure development and economic transformation initiatives continue to require substantial long-term investment.
These indicators do not suggest a conventional financial crisis. Saudi Arabia still possesses significant financial reserves, one of the world’s largest sovereign wealth funds, and extensive access to borrowing and investment capital.
Their importance lies elsewhere: they reflect a gradual shift in spending priorities.
Every riyal allocated to security and defense is a riyal not invested in infrastructure, education, technological development, or new economic ventures. The higher the cost of managing the Kingdom’s surrounding security environment, the greater the pressure placed on the economic model underpinning Vision 2030.
Political economy scholars frequently argue that the success of large-scale transformation projects depends not only on the availability of capital, but also on long-term stability and economic predictability. Megaprojects require decades of sustained financing, investor confidence, and institutional continuity, not merely periods of elevated government spending.
In this context, economic and security challenges have become more interconnected than ever before. The success of Vision 2030 is no longer determined solely by Saudi Arabia’s ability to construct new cities and infrastructure, but also by its ability to maintain a delicate balance between security and stability on the one hand, and economic transformation on the other.
As Gulf security expert Andreas Krieg has argued, security in the Gulf is no longer measured simply by the size of military budgets or the number of troops deployed. It is increasingly defined by a state’s ability to protect the economic environment upon which its long-term development plans depend, making the relationship between security and economic transformation more intertwined than ever.
Imported Security or a Redefinition of Security?
At first glance, military cooperation with Pakistan or reliance on allied forces in regional conflicts may appear to be a routine feature of defense policy, one that is common among many states around the world. In the Saudi case, however, the debate carries deeper implications tied to the nature of the state itself and the way power has historically been managed within the Kingdom.
Over the past decade, Saudi Arabia has relied in several conflict zones most notably in Yemen on local Yemeni formations, Sudanese forces, and regional allies to participate in ground operations, while the Kingdom’s most visible contribution remained concentrated in air power, logistics, air defense systems, and advanced military technology.
Regardless of the accuracy of reports concerning the number of foreign troops currently present in the Kingdom, one fact remains clear: military cooperation with external partners has long been a consistent component of Saudi Arabia’s security strategy.
The question raised by many analysts is therefore not whether such cooperation exists, but rather what it signifies. Does it reflect a need for specialized military expertise and strategic partnerships? Or is it part of a broader security model that favors a system of balanced arrangements and multiple centers of power over the development of a large, fully independent national ground force?
According to Gulf security specialist Andreas Krieg, Saudi Arabia has historically relied on a combination of external security partnerships and internal balancing mechanisms to preserve stability. This model differs significantly from the highly centralized military structures developed in some neighboring states.
Several scholars also argue that the Kingdom’s political history helped shape this approach. Maintaining equilibrium among different military and security institutions has long been a core principle of statecraft, reducing the likelihood that coercive power would become concentrated within a single institution.
Yet as regional tensions intensify and the costs of security and defense continue to rise, this model faces a new test. Saudi Arabia must simultaneously protect its ambitious economic projects, secure its borders and regional interests, and preserve domestic stability during a period of rapid economic and social transformation.
From this perspective, the central question may not be whether Saudi Arabia is “importing security,” but whether it is redefining the concept of security itself. After years of emphasizing economic transformation, openness, and investment, concerns related to stability, risk management, and strategic protection appear to be reclaiming a prominent place within the Kingdom’s policy calculations.
This shift does not necessarily imply the failure or retreat of Vision 2030. Rather, it suggests that the success of Saudi Arabia’s economic transformation has become increasingly dependent on the state’s ability to manage a more complex regional security environment and to strike a sustainable balance between ambitious development goals and the enduring demands of stability.
Beyond Vision 2030
Saudi Arabia continues to possess vast financial resources, substantial institutional capacity, and a regional position that makes it one of the most influential states in the Middle East. Discussions about delays in certain megaprojects or rising military expenditures do not suggest that the Kingdom is facing an existential crisis or standing on the brink of political or economic collapse.
What recent years have revealed, however, is that the central challenge is no longer merely financial or engineering in nature.
The megaprojects launched under the banner of Vision 2030 have evolved beyond development initiatives into a broader test of the state’s ability to manage a complex balance between economic ambition, political stability, and regional security. At the same time, issues such as the structure of the military establishment, reliance on external security expertise and partnerships, and the future relationship between the state and society have become part of a wider debate about the future of the Saudi model itself.
The Saudi leadership has succeeded in launching one of the most rapid economic and social transformation processes in the Kingdom’s modern history. Yet sustaining the momentum of this transformation requires more than building megaprojects or attracting foreign investment. It also depends on the state’s ability to develop resilient institutions capable of adapting to an increasingly uncertain regional and international environment.
Moreover, the challenges facing Saudi Arabia today do not stem solely from its borders or regional rivals. They also arise from the nature of the transition itself. The greater the ambition of economic transformation, the greater the need for a stable and predictable environment—and for a security framework capable of safeguarding these changes without becoming a burden on national resources and priorities.
In this context, the debate over security and development is no longer a choice between competing priorities, but rather between two deeply interconnected tracks. The success of one increasingly depends on the success of the other.
The most important question facing Saudi Arabia in the coming years is therefore not whether it can build new cities or launch even more ambitious projects. Rather, it is whether it can consolidate a long-term model that combines a diversified economy, effective national institutions, and sustainable political and security stability in a region that grows more complex with each passing year.
Ultimately, the strength of states is not measured solely by what they build, but by their ability to preserve and sustain those achievements when circumstances change and pressures intensify—and by their success in transforming grand ambitions into a durable reality that outlasts individuals, political moments, and shifting regional conditions.