Greenland and the EU’s Arctic Ambitions
Securing Strategic Autonomy in a Changing North
Lena Debanck
Abstract
As climate change and geoeconomic interests reshape the Arctic, Greenland is emerging as a key player in securing access to resources, trade routes, and influence in this increasingly contested region. The European Union must move beyond passive rhetoric and adopt a proactive approach by investing in Greenland’s infrastructure, fostering institutional partnerships, and integrating Greenland into wider Arctic planning initiatives. Updated European Union engagement in the region – and in Greenland more specifically – would enhance resilience, sustainability, and autonomy, while ensuring that Greenlandic local communities remain central to decision-making processes.
Introduction
The Arctic is becoming increasingly important to the European Union’s (EU) pursuit of strategic autonomy, due in particular to its untapped resources, new trade routes, and growing geopolitical significance. As a key Arctic territory with vast natural wealth and a pivotal location, Greenland holds unique potential for ensuring the EU’s future economic and energy security. Climate change and melting ice not only represent environmental phenomena but also open up new geopolitical realities, making access to the Arctic and partnerships in the region matters of strategic interest.
The Arctic region is primarily governed by the consensus-based Arctic Council and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, as well as the dedicated national policies of the eight individual Arctic states. The region encompasses the Arctic Ocean and the northernmost territories of the Arctic states: Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark (through Greenland and the Faroe Islands), Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States. The fact that three out of the eight states are EU member states, coupled with the rapidly evolving geopolitical landscape, calls for a more assertive and targeted EU role in the region.
Greenland’s relevance lies not only in its autonomy within the Kingdom of Denmark but also in its strategic location between the Western Hemisphere, Europe, and northern Asia, and in its possession of valuable natural resources and access to the sea. Despite having just around 57,000 inhabitants across its vast, resource-rich landmass, Greenland is a player with vital geopolitical assets. Its natural resources, location on emerging sea lanes, and proximity to North America make it a cornerstone of Arctic policy and a test for the EU’s credibility in its neighbourhood.
The EU should develop and implement a proactive, integrated Arctic strategy that moves beyond passive observation to active engagement. This strategy should prioritise resource security, sustainable cooperation, and strategic partnerships with Greenland and Denmark in order to safeguard the EU’s economic and energy interests, enhance its geopolitical influence, and assert its role as a key Arctic actor amid intensifying global competition. Without decisive action, the EU risks losing access to critical resources and influence to more assertive global players.
Greenland’s geoeconomic potential: what could the EU gain?
Greenland possesses substantial reserves of critical raw materials that are indispensable for the EU’s green and digital transitions (Derouin, 2025). According to a report by the Geological Survey of Denmark and Greenland, 25 out of 34 minerals on the EU’s critical raw materials list can be found in Greenland, including graphite, lithium, and rare earth minerals (Leclerc, 2025, p.7). The importance of these resources has increased significantly since the entry into force of the European Critical Raw Materials Act in May 2024. This Act sets clear benchmarks to reduce dependency on any single third country and aims to ensure that at least 10 per cent of extraction, 40 per cent of processing, and 25 per cent of recycling are carried out within the EU by 2030. These minerals are essential not only for clean energy technologies such as batteries and solar panels but also for defence systems and digital products vital to European industry (ENR, 2025). The 2021 EU Arctic strategy (European Commission, 2021) failed to explicitly state that Greenland was a strategic supplier for achieving these benchmarks, thereby missing a crucial opportunity to align Greenland’s vast resource potential with the EU’s long-term goals for strategic autonomy and supply chain resilience in the green and digital sectors.
The EU’s economic resilience and geopolitical flexibility would be safeguarded and enhanced by a reduction in its dependence on dominant suppliers such as China and select African states. In the context of mounting demand for critical minerals, the establishment of a stable and mutually beneficial partnership with Greenland is imperative if the EU is to achieve its long-term industrial and strategic objectives.
The island’s strategic position along prospective Arctic maritime corridors, such as the Northwest Passage and the Transpolar Sea Route, is of additional interest as these routes are becoming more navigable due to climate change (Spence & Hanlon, 2025). Greenland could use this opportunity to establish support facilities along the shipping lanes, develop maritime infrastructure, monitor and secure the routes, and facilitate military defence positioning (Leclerc, 2025). Consequently, the EU’s economic interests and resilience are significantly impacted by Greenland’s actions. To support Greenland in capitalising on its strategic position, the EU should consider channelling investments through available funds to provide financial and technological assistance for Greenland’s maritime infrastructure, route monitoring, and security capabilities. The provision of such support would facilitate the diversification of Greenland’s economy, enhance its sovereignty over critical infrastructure, and augment its geopolitical significance.
The Arctic is witnessing climate change at a pace three times faster than anywhere else in the world. The accelerated melting of ice sheets and permafrost is making Greenland’s mineral and hydrocarbon resources increasingly accessible for extraction. Although this opens up new areas for economic development, it is important to strike a balance between exploiting resources and preserving the environment. Effective governance frameworks that prioritise Indigenous participation in environmental stewardship are essential for fostering resilience in the face of these multifaceted challenges. Furthermore, recognising and protecting Indigenous rights is vital for promoting sustainable development and ensuring equitable resource management amid the escalating geopolitical focus on the region.
Although Greenland potentially has oil reserves, no commercial production has yet occurred because current policy prioritises environmental protection and renewable energy over fossil fuel development. In particular, Greenland focuses on expanding hydroelectric and wind power generation to meet domestic energy needs sustainably and reduce reliance on imported fuels or the extraction of fossil fuels. The EU has the potential to further leverage funding from the Multiannual Financial Framework, with a particular focus on its dedicated climate and energy transition programs, to support renewable energy projects in Greenland, facilitate technology transfer, and enhance sustainable infrastructure. This approach is consistent with the EU’s Green Deal objectives and Greenland’s commitment to environmentally responsible development. The close collaboration with Greenland should also be reflected in the negotiations for the upcoming Multiannual Financial Framework negotiations.
The EU’s strategic interests in the Arctic
The EU’s cooperation with Greenland reflects a strategic blend of economic, political, environmental, and security interests. The evolving partnership between Greenland, Denmark, and the EU highlights the need for collaborative frameworks that not only address the pressing challenges of climate change but also engage in sustainable resource management. These dynamics collectively reinforce shared security interests, positioning the Arctic as a critical arena for geopolitical engagement and cooperative security strategies in an increasingly contested environment.
Economic aspirations
Greenland’s vast mineral reserves, especially those of rare earth elements and hydrocarbons, are becoming increasingly important in the EU’s strategy to enhance energy security and reduce dependency on Chinese-dominated supply chains (Chuffart & Johnstone, 2025). To support this strategic interest, the EU signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Government of Greenland in 2023 (European Union & Government of Greenland, 2023a). This agreement established a partnership focused on developing sustainable value chains for raw materials. The aim is to promote the responsible extraction of these materials, create local value, and develop long-term cooperation in the supply of critical minerals. This approach aligns with the EU’s Global Gateway strategy, which promotes sustainable infrastructure and strategic connectivity partnerships in regions vital to the Union’s resilience and autonomy.
Despite the global interest in these critical minerals, the number of operational mining projects in Greenland remains very limited. Several factors, such as administrative hurdles, challenging weather conditions, and limited infrastructure and workforce, have served to impede the progress of commercial development. Currently, the mining industry accounts for approximately 1 per cent of Greenland’s economy, leaving most of the territory’s mineral wealth untapped (ENR, 2025). For the Greenlandic population, the long-term potential of these resources is seen not solely from an economic perspective but also as a potential avenue for enhancing political independence. To unlock this potential, the EU should adopt a proactive role in the de-risking of early-stage investments, support infrastructure development, and co-finance sustainable mining projects from Greenlandic companies or like-minded partners. This would ensure the EU’s long-term security of access to vital resources, while contributing to Greenland’s economic development.
In addition, the fisheries and partnership agreement that the EU holds with Greenland guarantees duty-free access to the European market and educational cooperation. Greenland receives more EU funding than any other overseas country or territory. The EU could further strengthen people-to-people ties, fostering capacity-building in Greenlandic institutions and supporting the development of a skilled workforce aligned with both local needs and broader EU priorities through additional promotion of Erasmus+ opportunities.
In this broader economic context, the EU–Greenland Partnership Agreement (European Union & Government of Greenland, 2023b) and the Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement (Council Decision 2024/3202) play complementary roles. The former ensures duty-free access for Greenlandic fishery products to the EU market and promotes educational cooperation; the latter governs EU access to Greenlandic fishing zones and supports sustainable fisheries management, thereby strengthening institutional and economic ties. Notably, Greenland receives more EU funding than any other Overseas Country or Territory (Nielsen & Strandsbjerg, 2024), reflecting the Union’s strategic interest in maintaining long-term economic and political cooperation with the island.
In the longer term, the formalisation of an expanded EU–Greenland partnership framework has the potential to enhance policy coherence and institutional alignment across raw materials, fisheries, and trade.
Political and governance objectives
The EU fertiliser industry currently produces about 40 per cent of total European hydrogen as raw material of ammonia pThe EU is seeking to strengthen its soft power in the Arctic by establishing cooperative governance frameworks that prioritise sustainable development and regional stability in Greenland (Nielsen, 2024). This can already be seen in the latest EU Arctic policy, which reflects the normative power approach of the EU, rather than laying the groundwork for the EU to become a conventional superpower (Debanck, 2023). Diplomatic initiatives, humanitarian goals, and investments in local communities aim to ease geopolitical tensions while reinforcing Greenland’s role as a stabilising partner in the context of Arctic security.
While Greenland does not possess its own military, its geographical location renders it a pivotal element in ensuring transatlantic security. It is located within the Greenland–Iceland–UK gap, a critical chokepoint for NATO’s maritime defence positioning (Rahbek-Clemmensen, 2020). Recent geopolitical tensions, particularly in the wake of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine and Trump’s aspirations to simply buy Greenland, have heightened the imperative for the reinforcement of security frameworks in the Arctic region (Mikkola, Paukkunen & Toveri, 2023).
Nevertheless, it should be noted that conventional military expansion does not constitute the EU’s primary competitive advantage. Instead, the Union should prioritise the development of cyber resilience, maritime monitoring, and hybrid threat management (Jacobsen & Rahbek-Clemmensen, 2024). The integration of surveillance with scientific research, for instance, has the potential to yield mutual benefits without contributing to militarisation. The promotion of local ownership, Indigenous inclusion, and environmental stewardship is not merely an ethical imperative: it is a strategic necessity for ensuring long-term cooperation. The EU has the ability to support capacity-building and inclusive governance structures, whilst aligning Arctic efforts with the European Green Deal.
Furthermore, the EU should promote trilateral cooperation with like-minded countries that share Arctic interests, such as European Free Trade Association members, to amplify its normative influence and operational reach. Given Greenland’s increasing autonomy, the EU must adapt its engagement strategy to align with local governance structures while at the same time integrating Greenland more comprehensively into Arctic and EU-level strategic planning processes. This situation necessitates the establishment of novel institutional frameworks that foster inclusive governance and facilitate direct Greenlandic involvement in collaborative initiatives.
By deepening this partnership, the EU stands to gain enhanced geopolitical credibility, strengthened strategic positioning in the Arctic, and early access to key governance networks that will shape the region’s future political and economic order.
Strategic forecasting and future scenarios
Given its geostrategic location within the Arctic, Greenland requires forward-looking planning to anticipate risks and opportunities. In an ever-changing geopolitical landscape, the possibility of a military build-up by NATO and Russia highlights the need for a robust EU diplomatic presence in the region. Prioritising the establishment of conflict-resolution mechanisms while continuing to support sustainable development and inclusive governance is crucial. Gattolin (2025) argues that the geopolitical reality of Greenland is evolving more rapidly than the EU’s response; if this pattern persists, others will fill this void. Delays in policy implementation could compromise the EU’s access to critical natural resources and diminish its involvement in a region that is essential to its long-term goal of strategic autonomy. A passive role could even undermine the EU’s credibility among Arctic stakeholders, including its member states Finland, Sweden, and Denmark – or possibly send the wrong message to non-like-minded states interested in gaining influence in the region.
Strategic forecasting must incorporate scenario-based planning that considers cooperation, hybrid conflict, and environmental crises. In all cases, Greenland’s role as a self-governing territory with deep Indigenous roots must be central. Indigenous knowledge and rights must be respected and integrated into governance frameworks to uphold international norms and ensure effective, legitimate policy outcomes. In her recent speech at the European Parliament plenary meeting in May, Vice-President of the European Commission Kaja Kallas reiterated this position: ‘Any decisions over Greenland’s future should be decided in the same way: by the people of Greenland’ (EEAS, 2025). According to Kallas, the only way to ensure respect for the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the sanctity of borders in a rules-based world order is to let the people of Greenland decide on their own future.
The strategic implications of Greenland for EU Arctic security
Greenland should be recognised not as a peripheral actor but as a central partner in the EU’s pursuit of strategic autonomy. The nation’s abundant natural resources, advantageous location, and evolving political status confer significant influence in shaping the future of the Arctic region. Consequently, this has a direct bearing on Europe’s capacity to operate autonomously in a global landscape characterised by mounting tensions and competitive interests. Should the EU be earnest in its commitment to reducing dependency on external powers, securing critical raw materials, and projecting influence through normative, non-military means, Greenland presents a strategic opportunity of unparalleled significance. To unlock this potential, the EU must transition from declarations to delivery: this necessitates a strategic investment in the development of Greenland’s infrastructure and sustainable mining capacity, the deepening of institutional partnerships, the promotion of inclusive governance, and the integration of Greenland into broader Arctic and EU-level planning processes. A more engaged, pragmatic, and forward-looking EU Arctic policy would not only help secure vital resources and supply routes but also reinforce the Union’s credibility as a geopolitical actor.
Greenland has been identified as a locale in which the EU’s objectives pertaining to resilience, sustainability, and autonomy converge. All forms of cooperation must be pursued in full partnership and consultation with Greenland, with the overarching objective being the support of its development goals. It is crucial that any decisions made are made with the consent of and to the benefit of Greenlandic communities as a fundamental principle. Policymakers must take decisive action to establish this approach as a pivotal area of strategic collaboration before other actors in the field do so.
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