Swedish Center for Studies and Research

Executive Summary

European democracy support has shifted from a proactive, expansionary agenda toward a defensive posture in response to authoritarian resurgence, foreign influence operations, and the global erosion of civic space. This paper explores the causes of this “defensive turn,” analyzes its manifestations in EU and member state policies, and evaluates its implications for the future of democracy assistance. Drawing on academic literature, official EU policy frameworks, civil society testimonies, and case studies from Ukraine, the Western Balkans, and the MENA region, the paper argues that Europe risks narrowing its democracy agenda to resilience-building and security, unless it rebalances toward positive reform and grassroots empowerment.

1. Introduction: A Changing Global Context

In the 1990s and early 2000s, the European Union (EU) positioned itself as a global normative power, exporting democratic norms through enlargement, neighborhood policies, and foreign aid. Countries in Central and Eastern Europe were incentivized through accession to adopt democratic reforms, while Mediterranean partners received governance support tied to trade and aid.

Since the mid-2010s, however, global dynamics have shifted:

• Authoritarian pushback: Russia, China, and regional authoritarian regimes have consolidated power and actively promoted alternatives to liberal democracy.
• Democratic backsliding: According to Freedom House (2024), global democracy has declined for 18 consecutive years.
• Hybrid threats: Disinformation, election interference, and cyberattacks increasingly target European democracies.
• Shrinking civic space: Over 60 countries have adopted restrictive NGO laws since 2012 (CIVICUS Monitor, 2023).

As Thomas Carothers notes, “democracy support has moved from expansion to defense—protecting what exists rather than extending its frontiers.”

2. Drivers of the Defensive Turn

Several structural and political drivers explain Europe’s shift:

2.1 Russia’s War on Ukraine

• Since 2014, Russian hybrid warfare—disinformation, corruption networks, and energy coercion—has directly targeted European states.
• The 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine transformed democracy support into a matter of security and survival.

2.2 China’s Digital Authoritarianism

• Export of surveillance tools (Hikvision, Huawei 5G, “Safe City” projects) has provided regimes with new methods of control.
• EU policy has responded with digital sovereignty measures and supply chain scrutiny.

2.3 Domestic Pressures

• Populist and illiberal movements within Europe (Hungary, Poland, Italy’s right-wing parties) have challenged the EU’s democracy agenda.
• Migration crises and economic instability shifted priorities from reform abroad to stability at home.

2.4 Disinformation and Election Interference

• The European Democracy Action Plan (2020) was crafted largely as a response to Russian disinformation during the Brexit referendum and 2019 European elections.

3. Manifestations of the Defensive Turn

3.1 EU Institutional Shifts

• European Democracy Action Plan (2020): Strengthens defenses against disinformation, secures elections, protects journalists.
• Global Gateway (2021): Infrastructure investment framed as counterweight to China’s Belt and Road, linking democracy with strategic competition.
• Digital Services Act (2022): Imposes obligations on online platforms to ensure transparency and accountability in content moderation.

3.2 Member State Responses

• Germany: Increased funding for resilience projects in Eastern Europe (political party foundations, hybrid threats research).
• Sweden: Expanded protection for human rights defenders, including relocation grants.
• France: Linked democracy support to counterterrorism and digital security policies.

3.3 Civil Society Partnerships

• More emphasis on rapid response funds for NGOs under threat.
• Support for fact-checking initiatives (e.g., EU vs Disinfo).

4. The Digital Battlefield

Democracy support is increasingly tied to digital governance:

• Platform regulation: The DSA compels Big Tech firms to disclose algorithms and remove disinformation.
• Cybersecurity aid: EU support to Ukraine includes funding cyber resilience against Russian hacks.
• Digital literacy programs: Civil society partnerships aim to equip citizens to resist online manipulation.

As Věra Jourová, Vice President of the European Commission, stated:

“Defending democracy in the 21st century means defending the digital space. If we fail here, we will lose it everywhere.”

5. Case Studies

5.1 Ukraine: Democracy and War

EU democracy support has become indistinguishable from security assistance. Electoral reforms, media freedom, and civil society support are tied to military and financial aid. Ukraine is the test case of democracy support under conditions of existential threat.

5.2 Western Balkans: Conditional Integration

• Democracy benchmarks remain part of accession talks.
• But criteria increasingly emphasize alignment with EU foreign policy (e.g., sanctions on Russia) rather than purely domestic reform.

5.3 MENA Region: From Reform to Stability

• Arab Spring initially spurred strong democracy support.
• By 2020s, focus shifted to migration management, counterterrorism, and conflict stabilization.
• Civic activists in Tunisia and Lebanon note declining EU funding for reform-oriented initiatives.

6. Risks of the Defensive Turn

While necessary, the defensive approach has risks:

1. Narrowing the agenda: Prioritizing resilience may sideline broader democratic reforms.
2. Instrumentalization: Democracy support tied to security or migration control undermines credibility.
3. Elite capture: Reliance on governments may marginalize grassroots actors.
4. Reputation risks: Critics in the Global South accuse Europe of hypocrisy, emphasizing stability over democracy.

As Larry Diamond warns:

“If democracy support becomes purely defensive, it risks losing its transformative edge and credibility.”

7. Toward a Balanced Democracy Support Model

Recommendations

1. Rebalance strategies: Combine resilience with proactive support for reform.
2. Empower civil society: Flexible, long-term funding to local actors under repression.
3. Strengthen digital democracy: Independent digital watchdogs and algorithmic transparency.
4. Narrative shift: Present democracy as a global public good, not a Western export.
5. Invest in positive agenda: Climate governance, inclusive economies, youth participation.

8. Conclusion

Europe’s democracy support has entered a defensive phase, shaped by geopolitical rivalry, digital authoritarianism, and civic repression. Defense is essential but insufficient. To remain credible, Europe must defend democracy while also cultivating it—not just shielding institutions, but enabling renewal and transformation.

As Federica Mogherini, former EU High Representative, reflected:

“Democracy cannot be defended only at the gates. It must also be cultivated within.”

The future of European democracy support lies in turning defense into resilience, and resilience into renewed democratic confidence.