Abstract

Information manipulation has become a central challenge for the European Union (EU), particularly in its Eastern neighborhood and the Western Balkans. Traditional counter-disinformation strategies have often been reactive and fragmented. This paper argues that the EU needs to adopt a more systematic and integrated approach to analyzing media ecosystems — focusing not only on the sources of manipulation but also on audience reception, media framing, and the vulnerabilities of public discourse. Drawing on case studies from Georgia and Serbia, the paper highlights how these dynamics operate in practice and offers policy recommendations for enhancing EU resilience and strategic communication.

Introduction

The European Union (EU) has increasingly recognized information manipulation as a strategic threat to its internal cohesion and external influence. Disinformation campaigns conducted by state and non-state actors, especially in the Eastern Partnership countries and the Western Balkans, aim to erode trust in democratic institutions, weaken EU enlargement prospects, and amplify polarization.

While several initiatives — such as the East StratCom Task Force, the EUvsDisinfo platform, and the European Digital Media Observatory — have been launched, these efforts often remain fragmented, focusing narrowly on identifying “fake news” or debunking specific narratives. This paper proposes that a systematic analysis of media ecosystems is required to understand not only what manipulative narratives exist, but also why they resonate with certain audiences and how they interact with local contexts.

Conceptual Framework: Rethinking the “Information Threat”

Current EU approaches tend to conceptualize disinformation primarily as a supply-driven problem — emanating from Russia, China, or other actors. However, this perspective overlooks:

1. Audience dynamics – How do citizens in Georgia, Serbia, or other states perceive EU messages? Which narratives generate trust, and which fail to resonate?
2. Media framing – How do national media outlets portray the EU, its policies, and its role in relation to Russia, China, or domestic actors?
3. Discourse susceptibility – What structural vulnerabilities in society (polarization, corruption, nationalism) make public debate more receptive to manipulation?

By integrating these three dimensions, the EU can move from a reactive to a proactive resilience strategy.

Case Study I: Georgia

Georgia represents one of the most pro-European societies in the Eastern Partnership. Yet, despite strong public support for EU integration, the information space is deeply polarized.

• Audience reactions: While younger Georgians largely trust EU institutions, rural and older populations are more vulnerable to anti-EU narratives framed around “traditional values” and “sovereignty.”
• Media framing: Pro-government and opposition outlets use EU integration selectively — either as proof of modernization or as a threat to national identity.
• Discourse susceptibility: Russian disinformation exploits religious conservatism and the unresolved conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia to portray the EU as weak and hypocritical.

These dynamics reveal that debunking Russian narratives alone is insufficient; the EU must address underlying grievances and ensure its communication connects with diverse audiences.

Case Study II: Serbia

Serbia illustrates the complexity of EU communication in a candidate country with ambivalent political leadership.

• Audience reactions: Surveys show that nearly half of Serbian citizens see Russia more favorably than the EU, despite the EU being Serbia’s largest donor and trade partner.
• Media framing: State-aligned media often downplay EU assistance while amplifying narratives of Western hypocrisy, especially around Kosovo. Russian media outlets (Sputnik Srbija) enjoy significant visibility.
• Discourse susceptibility: Nationalist rhetoric, unresolved status issues, and widespread distrust in institutions provide fertile ground for manipulative narratives.

The Serbian case demonstrates that strategic communication cannot be separated from political realities: as long as elites signal ambivalence toward EU integration, disinformation narratives will thrive.

Policy Recommendations

1. Adopt a systemic approach: EU strategies must move beyond debunking toward a holistic understanding of media ecosystems, integrating audience research, media framing analysis, and societal vulnerabilities.
2. Localize EU communication: Tailor messages to resonate with specific groups — rural populations, youth, minorities — rather than relying on one-size-fits-all campaigns.
3. Strengthen partnerships with independent media: Provide sustainable funding and training to local outlets that can act as trusted intermediaries.
4. Invest in audience-centered monitoring tools: Develop platforms that track not only the spread of narratives but also their reception, adaptation, and local framing.
5. Link communication with governance reforms: Address corruption, rule-of-law deficits, and social inequalities that make societies susceptible to manipulation.

Conclusion

The EU’s credibility and strategic presence in the Eastern Partnership and the Western Balkans depend not only on countering disinformation but also on understanding the ecosystem in which information circulates. By adopting a more integrated and systematic analysis of audience reactions, media framing, and discourse vulnerabilities, the EU can align its policies with on-the-ground realities.

The cases of Georgia and Serbia illustrate both the risks of neglect and the opportunities of proactive engagement. Ultimately, the fight against information manipulation is not only about defending truth but also about strengthening trust, resilience, and democratic legitimacy.