Prepared for the Swedish Center for Studies and Research
As political trends in many parts of the world have turned in more illiberal or openly authoritarian directions, international policies to support democracy have struggled to retain traction. There is a widespread feeling that the era of dynamic and effective international democracy support has passed. Different kinds of regimes around the world have made life increasingly difficult for external democracy support, while democracies are being pulled toward more realpolitik priorities that seem to sideline concern for democratic norms. Skeptics suggest that Western democracies anyway have little credibility or normative appeal left to incentivize democratic reform elsewhere given the misfiring of their political systems at home.
In light of all this, it has been clear for a number of years that the long-standing model of international democracy support has passed its sell-by date. Carnegie’s Democracy, Conflict, and Governance Program has explored the implications of this for U.S. foreign policy,1 and this paper considers what it means for European strategy. European democracy promotion was at its genesis built around the ambitious aims of weakening autocratic regimes, solidifying fragile democratic transitions, structurally transforming societies and political systems, ensuring democracy helped resolve conflicts, and exporting democratic values as a means of bringing other countries closer to the European Union—buttressed by the assumption that democracy in Europe was solid enough to serve as a reference point for reformers in other parts of the world. Policymakers and analysts have realized for several years now that this old paradigm no longer holds, and yet they have struggled to define or conceptualize its replacement.
In an effort to do just that, this paper argues that EU policies have already adjusted to the new era and that their emerging ethos can best be conceptualized as defensive democracy support. The first section identifies three axes of this approach. The paper then assesses its strengths and weaknesses, contending not only that the shift to a defensive democracy support is welcome and well-grounded in several crucial senses but also that it raises new doubts about the future of EU policies.
In the past decade, the European Union’s approach to democracy promotion has increasingly shifted from an assertive, normative agenda to a more cautious and inward-looking posture. This “defensive turn” reflects rising geopolitical pressures, democratic backsliding at home, and fears of foreign interference. This paper proposes a conceptual framework to understand this shift, analyzes its drivers and manifestations, and offers a critical evaluation of its implications for both EU foreign policy and the future of global democracy.
1. Introduction
Over the past twenty years, the European Union (EU) has positioned itself as a global leader in democracy promotion, integrating democracy, human rights, and rule of law into its external relations. However, recent shifts suggest that democracy support is increasingly being framed in defensive terms. Instead of promoting democratic values abroad, the focus has turned to “protecting” democracy at home and securing democratic institutions from internal and external threats.
This research paper unpacks this evolution, situates it in the broader global democratic recession, and argues that a new “defensive paradigm” is now shaping EU democracy support policies.
2. Conceptualizing the Defensive Turn
2.1. From Normative Power to Strategic Survival
Traditionally, the EU viewed itself as a “normative power” (Manners, 2002), exporting values through diplomacy, aid, and trade conditionality. However, rising authoritarianism, populism, and disinformation have pushed the EU to reframe democracy support as a matter of strategic survival rather than moral obligation.
2.2. Defensive Democracy as a Policy Logic
The concept of defensive democracy — historically used in domestic contexts to justify restrictions against anti-democratic actors — is now transplanted into foreign policy. The EU’s Global Strategy (2016) and the European Democracy Action Plan (2020) reflect this logic: democracy must be shielded from foreign subversion, cyber threats, and internal erosion.
2.3. Key Characteristics
- Risk aversion in external engagements
- Prioritizing resilience over reform
- Focus on cybersecurity, disinformation, and election integrity
- Less engagement in regime change or democratization abroad
- Conditionality based on stability, not transformation
3. Drivers of the Defensive Turn
3.1. Internal Challenges
- Democratic backsliding within EU member states, e.g., Hungary and Poland
- Populist rhetoric framing democracy promotion as elitist or interventionist
- Institutional fatigue in enlargement and neighborhood policy
3.2. External Threats
- Russian and Chinese influence operations
- Migration crises and border securitization
- Geopolitical instability in the Middle East and Eastern Europe
- Perception of democracy promotion as neocolonial or destabilizing
3.3. Strategic Reorientation
- The EU’s shift from transformative diplomacy to geopolitical realism
- Reduced emphasis on norm diffusion in favor of interest-based alliances
4. Manifestations of the Defensive Turn
4.1. European Democracy Action Plan (EDAP)
- Focus on protecting elections from interference
- Enhancing media pluralism
- Fighting disinformation and cyber threats
- Building institutional resilience within EU member states
4.2. Eastern Partnership Policy
- Emphasis on resilience, stability, and security rather than democratic transformation
- Reduced political conditionality
- Prioritizing governance and capacity building over democratization
4.3. Funding Instruments
- NDICI (Global Europe): restructured aid based on regional stability
- Shift in priorities from long-term institution building to short-term crisis response
5. Case Studies
5.1. Tunisia: From Engagement to Hesitation
After the Arab Spring, the EU invested heavily in Tunisia’s democratic transition. However, since the 2021 presidential power grab, the EU has adopted a cautious stance, focusing on security cooperation and migration control, rather than pushing for democratic restoration.
5.2. Ukraine: Between Support and Strategic Containment
The EU’s support for Ukraine post-2014 remains robust, but increasingly tied to security and geopolitical alignment, with less emphasis on deep democratic reform and more focus on state resilience and anti-corruption as strategic priorities.
6. Critical Evaluation
6.1. Advantages
- Realistic alignment with current geopolitical constraints
- Stronger focus on internal resilience and hybrid threat mitigation
- Reduced backlash against “democracy export” accusations
6.2. Concerns
- Risk of abandoning normative commitments
- Undermining long-term democratization goals
- Empowering authoritarian actors under the guise of pragmatism
- Moral dissonance between rhetoric and practice
7. Recommendations
- Redefine democracy support through a dual lens of resilience and transformation.
- Develop democracy clauses in trade and aid that go beyond mere stability metrics.
- Ensure independent oversight of funding mechanisms to avoid complicity with authoritarian partners.
- Invest in civil society actors and independent media as frontline defenders of democracy.
- Establish a pan-European democracy observatory to track backsliding and external interference across borders.
8. Conclusion
The defensive turn in European democracy support reflects deep changes in both the international system and the internal dynamics of the EU. While some degree of strategic recalibration is inevitable, the EU risks losing its identity as a global defender of democratic values. A more nuanced and balanced strategy — one that combines resilience-building at home with principled engagement abroad — is crucial for preserving the credibility and impact of European democracy support in the years ahead.
Bibliography (selected)
- Manners, I. (2002). “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?” JCMS.
- European External Action Service (2016). EU Global Strategy.
- European Commission (2020). European Democracy Action Plan.
- COAR (2022). Captagon: Syria’s Booming Drug Trade.
- EUDA Reports on Synthetic Drugs and Captagon
- Börzel, T.A., & Risse, T. (2019). Governance under Limited Statehood.
- Youngs, R. (2021). The EU’s Strategic Compass and Democracy Support.